Recent dimensions and future prospects of the Chinese family planning program:
Implications for policy implementation and fertility

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I. Introduction

The era of reform and opening to the outside world, initiated in China in the late 1970s, established economic requirements and goals, which set the agenda for the rest of society. Social programs became dependent on the country’s line of economic development. The Chinese family planning program is a case in point. In the 1970s, “population growth” was identified as a fundamental obstacle to economic development (Hua 1980), and in the country whose population history is in many respects the prime counter example to the classical Malthusian model, this rudimentary Malthusian paradigm became—and remains—the order of the day (Lee and Wang 1999). It is the basis for the large-scale state intervention in the process of human reproduction that began with the later-longer-fewer campaign (wan xi shao) of the 1970s (Blayo 1997, pp. 155-166) and the promulgation of the One Child Policy in 1979 (Croll, Davin, and Kane 1985; Banister 1987; Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988; Greenhalgh 1990). Unlike its less coercive predecessor, the One Child Policy was implemented through a system of administrative rewards for couples willing to stop at one child, and financial penalties and mandatory abortions for couples having unauthorized births (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister 1988; Aird 1986) and for cadres failing to meet the annually set birth quotas (White 1991).¹

The contribution of the family planning policy to changing reproductive behavior and to fertility decline has been substantial (Feeney and Wang 1993; Wang 1996; Wang

¹ Quotas are set by localities based on projections of numbers of marriages and births in each village. Couples intending to marry and have a child are required to obtain marriage and birth permits from local family planning offices. Although quotas are based in large measure on individual-specific conformity with population policy (zhence)—only those families whose total fertility is within the tight bounds of the One Child Policy and its variants are typically eligible for births under the quota (zhibiao)—it is very useful to maintain the distinction between the two. The Chinese certainly do.
and Yang 1996). In less than three decades, China’s crude birth rate has been halved, from 33 to 16 per 1,000 between 1970 and 1998 (State Statistical Bureau 1999). The application and enforcement of these policies has nonetheless been constrained by local social, political, administrative, and cultural conditions. In urban areas, successful policy implementation was aided by the household registration system, a powerful tool of policy enforcement (Feeney and Wang 1993). In rural areas, where the demand for more than one child, and at least a boy, is stronger, the One Child Policy was met with strong resistance (White 2000). Economic mechanisms of policy implementation, weakened by decollectivization and the introduction of the agricultural responsibility system (Greenhalgh 1993; Greenhalgh, Zhu and Li 1994), did not rival the enforcement role held by household registration in urban areas. As a result, since the mid-1980s, fertility policy implementation in rural areas has involved accommodations to “local conditions.” Foremost among these, the overwhelming preference for a son has led to the introduction of the One-Son-Two-Child policy (Greenhalgh and Li 1995). This policy allows rural couples to have two children if the first born is a girl, provided they wait four years and the mother is at least 28 years old (Li 1995; Tu 1995, p.170; Feng and Hao 1992). Approved methods to obtain compliance with the policy such as persuasion through “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo) were supplemented by other measures that left room to local interpretation of policy enforcement. Enforcement according to local conditions ranged from the use of coercion to exhortation to moral persuasion to inattention to collusion in neglect. Flexibility in local enforcement was often determined by cadres’ desire to maintain special relations in their locality (Freedman and Guo 1988; Zhang W. 1999), fear of outright physical violence (White 1991), or by the good political
connections of local governments, which obviate the need to curry favor with higher authorities through correct policy implementation. Thus some localities maintain a de facto two-child policy, perhaps disguised under permissible rubrics of “exception” (Merli and Smith 2000).

Today, the Chinese family planning program is at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is an unyielding reluctance by the Chinese government to diminish state control over reproduction. This is surprising since in many other domain of social life the last decade has seen a weakening in state control. On the other hand, there is a growing concern with the social, political, physical, and near-term economic costs involved in controlling reproduction. This has led to attempts to ameliorate the impact of the policy through the limited extension of personal choice of contraceptive methods—what the Chinese refer to as “informed choice” (zhiquing xuanze), the provision of higher quality contraceptive and reproductive health services, plus the abolition of annual birth quotas in administrative jurisdictions associated with projects sponsored by UNFPA (UNFPA 1997). Moreover, in accordance with an original provision of the One Child Policy that allows couples who are both only children to have a second child, 27 out of 34 provincial governments have announced their intention to pass legislation giving this provision legal standing (Agence France-Press, January 31, 2000). This allowance will soon become increasingly relevant in places where the one-child policy has been vigorously enforced for over 20 years: cities and provinces with especially strong population pressure (e.g., major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin, as well as Jiangsu,

2 But not necessarily the policy that proscribes births to women with one son and/or two children (where the first is a girl); see footnote 1, above.
Shandong, and Sichuan provinces). The Western press has interpreted these changes as a sign of policy relaxation (Rosenthal 1998; Barber and Harding 1999; Lev 2000; Rennie 2000; Chang 2001; Deutsche Press-Agentur 2001).

Yet both popular and academic commentaries on family planning policy in China often fail to draw a sufficient distinction between, on the one hand, the universally “legitimate” aspects of the family planning program, such as information, education, and communication campaigns, and the provision of free or subsidized contraception and reproductive health services, and, on the other, the fundamental policy—the woman-specific limits on fertility and the lengths the government is willing to go to see that these limits are maintained. Although the former aspects have been taken up by the program reorientation since the beginning of the 1990s, fundamental policy change is still not part of Chinese leaders’ official parlance. The emphasis within China continues to be that the population policy is standing, that population targets must remain in place, and that cadres must continue to take responsibility for family planning policy implementation.

Such reorientation in the Chinese family planning program as has occurred has taken place at a time when the dynamics between state and society in matters of family planning policy have undergone significant change. Growing concerns with the human costs of the One Child Policy and its rural adaptations were probably stimulated in part by larger reform era transformations in Chinese society, the development of “socialist legality,” and limited political reform in the form of local elections. At the same time, an increasingly globalized market economy has contributed to Chinese couples’ changing notions of family size. Individual family size preferences are coming closer to those of the government (Merli and Smith 2000). Whereas the 1980s saw accommodation of the
state to peasants’ demands, the 1990s saw greater accommodation by the populace to the national reproductive policies. Rising prices, rising inequality, and rising opportunity are a recipe for lowering the value of children. These factors make it easier for Chinese couples, especially those living in cities and in economically advanced rural areas, to adopt voluntary limits on family size (Zeng 1997; White 2000).

To these structural changes and conditions should be added the very persistence of the One-Child Policy and its rural adaptations. The policy is now in its third decade; a whole generation of people has grown up in its thrall. Memory of alternative choices and policies must be fading and it is quite possible that compliance with the policy is shading into acceptance. This is a reasonable scenario in an environment in which a continual theme has been the subordination of individual goals to those of the collectivity (Lee and Wang 1999), and where public acceptance is widespread of the narrative that equates backwardness with a burgeoning population, and modernity and national salvation with a smaller, higher quality population (Anagnost 1995). It is to the degree that people in China agree with this perspective that they are inclined to support and accept the population policy.

Is the Chinese government closer to a relaxation of the policy than they are willing to admit? Are the conditions ripe for policy relaxation? In this paper, we shall examine the prospects of policy relaxation from the perspectives of some of the major actors in the system—the central government, the State Family Planning Commission, the provincial and local governments, the State Family Planning Commission at various levels, the population and development experts, and the local community leaders, as well as the peasants themselves. Economic change would have sufficed.

3 In the economic perspective, the coercive, mandated population policy has been unnecessary (Sen 1997) or all but unnecessary (Scotese and Wang 1995) from the standpoint of reducing fertility. Economic change would have sufficed.
and the local cadres. The Chinese central government is well aware of the political and economic costs of maintaining a stringent totalitarian policy, but it is unwilling to experiment with relaxation of couple-specific constraints on family size because of a fear that this will jeopardize aggregate population goals. The State Family Planning Commission is centrally involved in the formulation of state population policy and is charged with its implementation. It is sandwiched between the central government and the localities, whose understandings of the family planning program are often widely discordant. Local cadres are mandated to translate the will of the state to the peasantry through the enforcement of policies. They inevitably mediate state policies and adapt them to suit their own exigencies.

A better understanding of the functions, roles and administrative responsibilities of the functionaries of the family planning bureaucracy, an evaluation of their readiness to support program orientation and promote policy change, and a discussion of the implications of these changes for their own work and position will add a valuable perspective and inform the discussion about prospects of policy change.

We pursue our investigations based on field observations, interviews and conversations with national and local family planning cadres over more than a dozen field visits to rural China between 1991 and 2001.

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4 Conspicuously absent from this list is the population itself—“the people,” or women who labor under the existing policy. The measurement of public opinion via sample surveys is in general difficult in China (Shi 1996), especially for subjective matters related to fertility and family planning (Hermalin and Liu 1990), although we have elsewhere attempted to use survey data to tease out changes in acceptance of the family planning program (Merli and Smith 2000). The focus of the current paper, however, is on policy and its implementation as can be observed from the formal and informal statements (and behaviors) of those formulating and administering policy.
II. The Four Study Locales

Fieldwork for this study was conducted under the auspices of the project “Introducing New Contraceptives in Rural China” (INCRC). The formal INCRC project was a field experiment conducted by the State Family Planning Commission of China (SFPC) between 1991 and 1996 with technical input from Peking University and the University of Pennsylvania. As with any large-scale, long-term project, the goals were both diffuse and evolutionary.

The primary purpose of the study was to assess the possibility to relax total state control of reproductive decision-making by offering women a choice of contraceptives, including new methods (Norplant) and superior versions of existing methods (Copper-T IUDs). In addition, an attempt was made to improve the service orientation of family planning workers. As such, the INCRC project was among the first in a series of projects aimed at the reorientation of the family planning program, and has been succeeded by a variety of “Quality of Care” projects (Population Council 2000; Gu 2000; Simmons et al. 2000).

The study was conducted in four counties in rural north China, Huasheng and Pangxie in Hebei, and Ciqixian and Shanshui in Shandong (county names are pseudonyms). The four counties were chosen by the SFPC. From the standpoint of the SFPC, the selections were “purposive,” although it is far from clear what purpose the officials involved had in mind. There was certainly a strong aspect of clientism, since the counties selected stood to gain a fair measure of local prestige, not to mention the infusion of substantial sums associated with the implementation of the study’s experimental design. The four counties also lay in the rural hinterland of two cities...
singled out for their model family planning performance in their respective provinces, Tangshan city in Hebei and Zibo city in Shandong. At the same time, the central SFPC officials were surely aware that the project was going to make great demands on the participating counties—in addition to fielding large-scale sample surveys, the INCRC project featured a demographic and contraceptive surveillance system comprising an eventual total of 145,000 woman-records (Smith et al. 1997)—and they must have had some concerns about the local officials being able to “deliver” under scrutiny from international observers. Whatever the eventual balance of these factors in the selection process, the result was a surprisingly heterogeneous set of counties in terms of ecology, economy, and commitment to and understanding of family planning (Merli and Smith 2000).  

Within each of the four project counties, six townships were selected at random; within each set of six, four were assignment to the study’s treatment—more and better contraceptives, and a choice of which to use—and the other two served as controls (in principle, business as usual). But, from the earliest rounds of data collection, it became evident that there were interesting demographic and programmatic distinctions both within and between the counties. As more data came in, it was also clear that experimental effects of program change (if any) paled in comparison with secular changes in fertility and family planning. Coupled with ongoing tensions in the collection of accurate demographic data (Smith et al. 1997), we became increasingly interested in

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5 Tu (1995, p. 170) offers that “[t]he criteria for the selection of the four counties were that they have an average family planning performance and that they be representative of the provinces’ socioeconomic and geographic diversity”; and that they represent “the kind of model in family planning that the government has been trying to promote” (Tu 1993, p. 1).
the politics, economics, and social organization of the family planning system, including variations within our study sites. Although the formal project took no account of the measurement of these phenomena, our field visits and field notes came to concentrate heavily on gleaning “side information” about local process, so that we might better understand the data being collected by the INCRC project—the “how’s” and “why’s” of the study. It is on the basis of these observations—made during the implementation of the INCRC project and in subsequent evaluations of the study sites—that this paper is written.

Huasheng is the closest county to Beijing, at about two to three hours drive. Its per capita (p.c.) income in 1999 was 3,200 yuan, up from 570 yuan at the outset of the project in 1991. Huasheng is designated as a semi-mountainous county with a significant proportion of Man ethnic minority. This county was home to Wang Guofan, whose agricultural co-operative was singled out for praise by Mao Zedong in the early 1950s (Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden 1991). This iconic political connection has made Huasheng a unique place. Its cadres have a sense of strong accomplishment and dignity. Huasheng has experienced a certain amount of social and economic success, perhaps related to their connections, but there is a sense in which local cadres may be so overwhelmed by their comparatively early history of successful economic development that they overlook the problems they are facing. Year after year during the 1990s, Huasheng made no progress in city development while changes in the other project counties were much more evident.

6 This is not withstanding political advancement: Early in the decade, Huasheng’s designation was upgraded from county (xian) to municipality (shi), notwithstanding any evident ecological change differentiating Huasheng from other rural counties.
Despite its closeness to Beijing, Huasheng has a *de facto* two-child policy. How can this be? When we put this question to officials—local, municipal, or national—the stock answers are that minority populations are entitled to a second child as are populations in mountainous areas, where life is hard. Indeed, these are principles enshrined in the national family planning policy (Blayo 1997). In Huasheng, however, the Man minority is concentrated in only one of our six sample townships, and its villages all lie on a plain surrounded by mountains (hence the *semi*-mountainous designation). We suspect that the two-child policy in Huasheng exists simply because of its favorable political connections.

Pangxie is another two hours past Huasheng, on the coast. It has been a model county for family planning work since the start of the *wan-xi-shao* campaign in the early 1970s. The county remains the best-performing county in Hebei province as regards family planning. In the last two years, Pangxie officials were invited to the provincial capital to introduce their experiences in family planning work so as to provide a model for the rest of the province. The county is so outstanding in family planning that the county family planning director often boasts they can get more funding from the province any time they ask (this boast is belied by evidence of financial concerns detailed below). Pangxie has not greatly benefited from China’s rapid pace of economic development. Its economy relies completely on agriculture. The p.c. income of Pangxie is reported as
3,560 in 1999, up from 606 yuan in 1991. Maintaining the title of model county in family planning has been a top priority at every administrative level. As a result of many years of low fertility (currently Pangxie reports a total fertility rate of 1.1), its leaders have gradually become aware of the growing elderly population that could hinder the county’s economic development.

Ciqixian is two hours away from Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province. It is the most urban and industrialized of the four counties. In 2000, the p.c. income of its population was 3,328 yuan, up from 969 yuan in 1991. Women in Ciqixian are better educated than women in other counties. Many of them work in non-agricultural jobs. Because they are more likely than in women in other counties to accept the family planning policy (Merli and Smith 2000), their reproduction is not tightly monitored by local family planning officials. Ciqixian’s main industrial product is porcelain, which has made a good number of villages we visited quite prosperous. Ciqixian is also a place with a rich liquor culture. Each meal was a banquet where there were strict rules in terms of who should toast first and how many times a person should toast.

Shanshui, with the most beautiful natural surroundings among our study areas, borders Ciqixian to the south; it is the most mountainous and rural county. National policy permits women living in mountainous areas to have two children regardless of the sex of the first child, and Shanshui is certainly more mountainous than Huasheng, yet in

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7 We say “reported” because this would make Pangxie the county with the highest income among the four that we studied, and this strikes us as unlikely. (Ciqixian is almost certainly better off economically; Huasheng, too.) These income statistics evince a spurious precision, and are better taken as (at best) order of magnitude estimates. In this sense, what is relevant here is that Pangxie, like China more generally, has experienced substantial economic progress during the past decade.
Shanshui townships the One-Son-Two-Child policy prevails. This is in line with the management of family planning in Shandong province, which has a history of especially strict policy enforcement. Formerly classified as one of the nation’s “poverty” counties (*pinkun xian*), over the last few years, Shanshui has experienced some economic development, and has become, in the words of local officials, a county of self-reliance (*zili gengsheng*). Its p.c. income in 2000 was 2,324 yuan, up from 499 yuan in 1991. Agriculture crops have been diversified, with a shift from wheat to more profitable crops like grapes, peaches and other fruits. While proud of their achievements, local officials routinely remind us of their backwardness (in the presence of national and provincial officials), perhaps because being a “poor county” puts them in line for provincial subventions. Indeed, among the four counties, the Shanshui family planning director was the one who most insistently argued for financial support from the funding agency and the upper level family planning officials.

**Field work in the four counties**

Our access to the four counties was facilitated by the INCRC project and the good relationships we established with the SFPC during the course of the project. We have made more than a dozen trips to the study counties, one or more per annum from 1991 to 2001. The purposes of our visits were, variously, to meet local officials and select study sites, to monitor the general course of the research, to participate in training of interviewers during the preparation of two surveys conducted for the project, to interview family planning workers and their clients, to set up a computerized record-keeping system.

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8 Ciqixian is actually a district of Zibo city, but with the majority of its population (87%)
system, to maintain a demographic and contraceptive surveillance system, to examine related health system records, and to observe and evaluate the extent to which the innovations in family planning and reproductive health introduced by the INCRC project have been maintained as a functioning policy and have been extended beyond the project sites.

Our visits are born out of the structure of the relationship between the SFPC and outside consultants and observers; but also, as guests of the SFPC, they are born out of the relationship and interactions between higher and lower levels of government. Our exchanges are typical of all inter-organizational exchanges and relations in contemporary China. There are ritual formalities that attend each field visit: in Hebei, meetings with municipal family planning officials in Tangshan; in Shandong, meetings with provincial officials in Jinan and municipal officials in Zibo; in each county, meetings with local government leaders and family planning cadres; in all townships, meetings with a local leader and the local family planning cadres; in villages, meetings with village leaders and women’s group leaders; and, everywhere, banquets or other formal meals.

Some of our visits were less structured than others. The formal structure of our visits depended on the visitor’s age, seniority, rank, national origin, connection to the funding agency, and whether conversations and interviews were conducted in Chinese or through a translator. At the outset, it was difficult to avoid a certain staged ritual, well described by Bianco (1981) twenty years ago, in which scads of meticulous, fantastical data are paraded before the visitors until strained credulity trumps formality, and briefings degenerate into polite parrying between bemused (or frustrated) visitor and

classified as rural.
nonplussed (or slightly indignant) host. Thus of greatest importance has been the
duration of the project and the frequency of our visits. Each additional visit diminished
the novelty component and increased the degree of familiarity between investigators and
local bureaucracies. This, plus the repeated nature of our visits, has enabled us to
observe, at close range and over time, the organized family planning system: how it
presents itself, the relations in its hierarchy (from Beijing all the way down to the village
level), replacements of its members, their attitudes toward family planning work and its
changes, and their professional behaviors in response to an era of rapid social and
economic transformation. Our interchanges—formal and informal—were with
functionaries in this system at the national, provincial, municipal, county, township and
village levels. We were, for better or worse, participant observers of the social
organization of the family planning system in these counties and the changes it has
undergone over the last decade.

III. The Various Levels of the Family Planning Bureaucracy

As most of our information derives from our experience with four specific
countries, we focus mainly on what is happening from the standpoint of local actors—the
family planning cadres. To set the context, however, we begin with brief discussions of
the present position of the central government and its agent, the State Family Planning
Commission.
III.1. The Central Government

The central government sets demographic targets and guidelines to achieve these targets, announcing them periodically in central documents on population and family planning. The central government is reluctant to experiment with an across-the-board relaxation of couple-specific fertility limitations, the “policy”. It fears a rebound in fertility similar to that occurred during a previous relaxation of policy in the mid-1980s (Feeney et al. 1989). To avoid any misconception, the most recent central government document on population and family planning of March 2000 endorses what is known in official parlance as the “three no-changes” (san bu bian): no change in the present policy, no change in the already set population target (1.4 billion by 2010 and birth rate below 15/1000), and no change in the system linking family planning performance to the evaluation of local governments and party (i.e., sanctions against local mayors and party secretaries if the population goals are unmet) (Document No. 8 2000). The population discourse in government documents still reflects the hegemonic status of population policy, which is regarded as a key factor in accelerating economic development and socialist modernization, and one that makes population policy a matter of national survival. However, the strong rhetorical undertones about population control that pervaded a 1991 central document on population and family planning and called for tighter rural enforcement (White 1994) have been toned down, and the 2000 document is willing to leave part of the population control job to economic forces:

“By undertaking economic development, educational popularization and the development of medical causes, people should be encouraged to consciously practice family planning. Proper economic policy should be worked out to combine the work of population and family planning with the economic development, anti-poverty effects and the building of a civilized and happy family by providing those family planning households with small-amounts loans, priority items, scientific assistance
and preferential treatment, hoping to help the farmers cope with their difficulty and make money by having fewer babies (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC 2000).”

The government expects the Chinese population to peak at 1.6 billion people in 2050, at which point the growth rate of the population is projected to become negative and the population size to decline. There is thus a sense that the current phase is the terminal stage of the One Child Policy. In fact, since its promulgation, the One Child Policy was regarded as a matter of one generation (Zhonggong zhongyang 1980). Government representatives today claim that this policy cannot continue for another generation, lest it create a distorted age structure with not enough adult children in a family to care for aging parents (Lev 2000). Yet the government remains loathe (at least to date) to signal an end to the policy.

III.2. The State Family Planning Commission

The SFPC is the bureaucratic arm of the central government, responsible for translating central directives into policy guidelines and devising new implementation methods. They are sandwiched between the central government, which wants them to continue making progress in population control, and local governments involved with the day-to-day operations of policy enforcement. Although they are aware that conditions in cities and economically more advanced rural regions may be ripe for experimental relaxation of fertility policy, they feel they are ill equipped to carry out such changes. The usual justifications given are poor management skills and practices of local family planning cadres. But these lamentations also mask an underlying fear that reflects the SFPC’s intricate involvement in central government. Change in fundamental family planning
policy may prompt political instability, and thus be subject to sudden reversal. National family planning cadres do not wish to find themselves in the difficult position of retrenching. It is easier not to concede too much too fast.

At the same time, the SFPC fears that, were policy relaxation implemented on an experimental basis, cadres and peasants living in areas not chosen for the experiment may claim inequities and mount opposition. This would compromise the government’s effort to maintain good working relations with rural cadres whose cooperation is needed in the general development process. It would also engender rural stability, a major concern of the leadership over the last decade as reports of protests by peasants about excesses enforced by local cadres are on the rise (Li and O’Brien 1996).

A telling example of the SFPC’s reaction to the announcement that 27 provinces to pass legislation giving legal standing to the provision of the One Child Policy that allows only children reaching adulthood to have a second child. The SFPC fears a rebound in fertility, and the ensuing reprimand by the central government. From our conversations with SFPC officials, this announcement was a source of anxiety. SFPC officials think they are not sufficiently safeguarded against possible repercussions if fertility increases as a results. They have also been asking the State Council to draft a national population and family planning law which would put most of the responsibilities for policy enforcement in the hands of provincial family planning committees, thus safeguarding national family planning cadres from having to deal with the various

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9 Our experience, in trying to implement an experiment that involved perceived benefits for some townships, but not others, is that neighboring townships, counties, etc. are acutely aware of what is going on elsewhere and that provincial and municipal officials did not find it easier to implementing the treatment in some areas but not others.
consequences of excesses in policy enforcement. The draft law is presently being examined by the National People’s Congress. It urges each provincial people’s congress to come up with regulations on second births which should “meet the levels of economic and cultural development and population status in each province” (Zhong Xin She, June 26, 2001).

Although the SFPC is perfectly knowledgeable regarding resistance to the family planning program—SFPC officials from Beijing are frequently engaged in furtive reconnaissance of local family planning cadres in areas proximate to our study sites—the bureaucratic character of the SFPC makes it an unlikely leading edge for change. A better measure of the attitude of the SFPC is the curious data on performance that they provide—data that are increasingly at variance with other, more credible sources (Attané 2000, pp. 234-235), but that give the surface impression that all is going according to plan.

III.3. Local Family Planning Cadres

Local family planning cadres are probably the most significant level of the family planning bureaucracy for any study of policy implementation and policy change. They are the ones responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the family planning policy and the execution of the program reorientation. The extent to which they interpret the will of the state to the peasants is going to have important implications for the nature of the program orientation and the future of the family planning policy. Over the last decade, the focus on a client-centered approach promoted by the program reorientation (e.g., “informed choice”) has meant significant changes in the tasks performed by rural
family planning cadres. In addition, social and economic transformations that have taken place since the inception of the One Child Policy, as well as financial reforms enacted at the local level have greatly influenced local cadres’ roles and responsibilities.

III.3.a. The profile of local family planning cadres

Local family planning cadres are formally ranked within the *nomenklatura* at the county, township, and village levels. Each level reflects a specific degree of seniority within the cadre force related to age, expertise, and political importance. These characteristics are likely to be related to differences in personal and political behavior. County and township cadres are government officials whose salaries are paid by the state according to a standard scale (Oi 1999), and contract cadres whose salaries are paid by the localities. Cadres working in the administration offices are government employees, while those working in family planning stations are hired on a contract basis. Government officials have typically higher status, which entitles them to an urban registration (*hukou*) and the panoply of benefits that this entails. Conversely, village cadres are not accorded the status of resources of an official level of government. Their salaries are paid from village revenues (taxes and other fees), with the amount determined by township governments (Oi 1999).

County and township family planning cadres are responsible for the coordination of policy enforcement in its day-to-day operation. To some extent, their profile reflects

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10 A cadre is technically a government or party official whose income is paid by the state. This is the case among township and county cadres, as township and county are respectively the first and second formal rungs in the local government hierarchy, but not among village officials, who are paid by the village administration. For simplicity, however, we shall refer to village officials as village cadres.
the changing priorities of the family planning program over the course of the last two
decades. A typical cadre in the 1980s and early 1990s was poorly educated, often
demobilized from military service, or perhaps even a peasant who served in the
communist forces during the revolution (lao geming). For the most part, this meant that
local cadres were outsiders, not only to the locality but also to the province (Goodman
2000). The means they employed to enforce family planning regulations were
authoritarian in nature, aimed at policing reproduction and punishing transgressors. At
the outset of the INCRC project, the family planning directors in the two Shandong
counties were a former revolutionary and a demobilized military cadre. They had been in
this job since the early 1980s.

Today, county family planning cadres are younger and better educated. Like
other government and party cadres, the current directors of county family planning
committees have advanced from positions in less prestigious county or township
government offices, or in the party apparatus. Temporary transfers to township posts are
often necessary in order to be assigned to a county job in the next job move (Cai 2000).
Of the four directors of the family planning offices in the INCRC counties in June 2000,
one was a former party secretary in a township, one held a lower-ranked position in the
same committee, one held a lower-ranked position in the county security bureau, and one
was a newspaper editor-in-chief. Turnover is fast. After a three-year term, cadres are
promoted to a higher position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, but the assignments can be
shorter. Good relations (guanxi) with the leaders of the county government can increase
the chances of promotion of county and township officials, but good performance in
policy implementation can smooth the way, too (Oi 1999). Conversely, poor
performance provides grounds for demotion. In June 2001, we found that three of the four county family planning directors had been transferred to new positions after less than a year. Two were promoted to positions equivalent to deputy county mayor, while the third was demoted because of poor scores awarded to the county family planning committee during a city-wide performance evaluation.

Unlike the old generation of cadres, today’s cadres are familiar with the means of persuasion through propaganda, less so with disciplinary means. Increasingly, they work in their native place or in localities where they have lived for a long time. Yet, their political allegiances have remained unchanged. Like old cadres, most new family planning cadres are communist party members; their career paths reinforce the lack of separation between party and state. Many of the county family planning cadres have held the post of township party secretary, a natural stepping-stone before being promoted to higher-level county jobs. All three newly appointed county family planning directors were former township party secretaries.

In their administrative capacity, township cadres serve as liaisons between county and villages. Of the three levels of the local bureaucracy, township cadres are probably the least attached to their places of work. They identify with the party-state apparatus more than with the local communities. It is typical for them to live in township dorms during their assignment to the township, and visit their families in the county town on weekends, while they wait for the coveted county job.

Unlike township cadres, village cadres are tightly intertwined with village life. They are native to the village, with fewer chances of promotion to township or county offices. The length of their job tenure depends on villagers, who vote them into office.
Local popularity is a major criterion for election. Kinship ties are important, too. Village cadres are part-time salaried workers and their income depends on village resources. A village family planning cadre typically assume multiple responsibilities, including family planning, health, and the women’s federation.

III.3.b. The operations of the family planning system and the cadre evaluation system

The functioning of the family planning system has changed little over the last two decades. This system requires that each task be assigned from higher to lower administrative levels. Thus local family planning work is assigned on the basis of larger projects at the provincial or municipal level. After being assigned a task from the city, the county adjusts its task according to local conditions. It may add a “cap” (daimao) to the task to ensure that the assignment will be completed. This task, in the form of quotas, is then distributed to the townships according to population size and past performance in family planning. The township family planning office acts as the agent for the county, assigning targets and plans to the village. A “cap” may also be added to the work assigned to individual villages (Zhang W. 1999). Each year, village family planning cadres report up to the township office the number of women who will marry or who are projected to give birth the following year. With these data, township offices award quotas to each village.

Each level is evaluated by the higher levels based on performance and ability to meet targets. The criteria by which cadres are evaluated determine their level of remuneration and influence their tenure in office and opportunities for promotion. In the four research sites, county township and village family planning cadres are evaluated against a set of
performance criteria (kaohe zhibiao) which reflect municipal and provincial leaders’ programmatic priorities. Birth quotas are still regarded as one evaluation criterion, although local leaders confirmed that quotas are no longer exceeded. Other performance criteria --users’ level of satisfaction with the services provided, users’ knowledge of the range of contraceptive methods offered -- are presently more important. They are determined to ensure the correct implementation of informed choice and quality of care schemes. In some localities, informed choice is used as a merit token. County regulations hanging in village family planning offices detail the requirements needed for a village to introduce and maintain informed choice as a functioning policy. A village can implement informed choice if certain conditions are met. The most important one is that the village must not have had any out-of-plan births for three consecutive years. Informed choice will be taken away from all village women if the village has out-of-plan birth.

Following the introduction of the family planning cadre responsibility system introduced in 1991 (yi piao fou jue), which links family planning performance to the evaluation of local governments, statistical reporting is an important indicator of performance not only of family planning cadres, but also of major local leaders such as the party secretary and the head of the local government (Cai 2000). Counties, townships, and villages compete to be awarded model titles, which indicate good performance in family planning. Many of the township family planning offices we visited were proudly displaying these awards, often granted for consecutive years. These
awards may carry a prize in cash. Pangxie, a long-time model county in family planning, has been awarded prizes over several years. Last year, the city awarded the Pangxie family planning committee 20,000 yuan. The sum was used for bonuses for county family planning officials.

Village leaders are also evaluated on a range of performance indicators. The amount of their salary is linked to the economic performance and population size of the village, and is determined by township cadres based on performance.

The cadre evaluation system may affect township cadres the most, because, in their aspiration to be promoted to a position in the county seat, they are the ones who have most at stake (Cai 2000:795). Their job is also the hardest: they must ensure that policies are enforced at the grassroots but, as outsiders, they lack the connections and the bargaining power held by village cadres.

III.3.c. Changes in the nature of family planning work

Local family planning cadres interact with peasant society on a day-to-day basis and bear the brunt of the difficulty of conducting family planning work. When asked about whether they see any changes in family planning work and in the way in which the policy is enforced, all family planning cadres agree that the last decade has seen significant change in the nature of family planning work. Coercion is no longer the primary means of policy enforcement, because rural couples have, for the most part, come to accept smaller families. Out-of-plan births have become rare, and so have administrative

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11 The evaluation of local cadres not only pertains to the realm of family planning. It was in fact instituted to evaluate the economic performance in the rural industrial sector. Whiting (2001:100-118) provides an exhaustive description of the evaluation system of
measures, such as fines for unauthorized births, forced abortions, and other coercive measures. Village family planning workers maintain that pre-set quotas are no longer exceeded. At the same time, they acknowledge that the provision of new contraceptives and follow-up reproductive health services has increased their workload. Local family planning workers must be educated in the new methods, including the recognition of side effects. Local doctors have to be trained in the insertion and removal of Norplant. Periodic check-ups of Norplant users are also required. Cadres are aware of the potential costs involved with allowing personal choice of contraceptive methods, and of the threat it poses for their ability to keep births within quota. The example of a long term contraceptive such as the Norplant implant is telling. This method probably substitutes best for female sterilization, the most ubiquitous method of family planning in China, and one that removes a great deal of the monitoring burden from local cadres. Leaving the choice of a preferred method to women implies that reversible methods (such as Norplant or IUDs) may replace female sterilization, thus augmenting the monitoring burden of cadres and increasing the potential for a rise in fertility. The association between informed choice, reversible methods and the potential for more out-of-plan births is in fact in the back of the mind of each and every family planning cadre, and for good reasons, since the number of out-of-plan births remains an evaluation criterion of their performance. At the same time, family planning cadres maintain that the reorientation of the family planning program with the provision of new services has improved their relationships with the masses, and this is undoubtedly a welcome departure from the past.

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rural cadres, performance criteria and incentive structure.
III.3.d. Changes in the financing of family planning

What is less openly discussed but is germane to our purpose of assessing prospects for policy change are changes in financing of family planning work.

A major feature of the economic reforms in the 1980s was devolution of expenditures from central to local governments, down to the township level. Each sub-national level of government was made primarily responsible for its own revenues and expenditures, a move which was popularly referred to as “eating in separate kitchens” (fenzao chifan). These fiscal reforms strengthened the incentives to promote local industry as localities’ financial wealth became dependent on the amount of taxes levied on rural enterprises. Responsibility for financing many public goods also devolved to local governments (Wong 1991), thus making the revenue imperative more acute. Over time, township governments became increasingly dependent on extra-budgetary revenues to perform administrative functions and social programs, especially health and education. Extra-budgetary revenues, extracted from local enterprises in the form of profit remittances and various fees and from individuals in the form of surcharges from taxes and public utilities, played an increasingly important role in township finances. The proportion of self-raised funds grew as a share of non-budgetary revenues (Whiting 2001: 87; Jin and Zhou 2000), while reports of cadres’ abuses, peasants’ complaints and suggestions on how to rectify these problem increased in number and intensity (Gao 2001; Eckholm 2000).

The family planning system experienced similar budgetary changes, though later than other sectors of government. While, in the 1980s, the day-to-day operation of local family planning offices and the provision of contraceptives relied entirely on central,
provincial and municipal government funds, today the central administration continues to mandate family planning policy, but, it is providing little of the funding for implementation. Like in many other localities across China, fines for out-of-plan births represented a significant source of extra-budgetary funds for local governments of the four counties. In the early 1990s, Hebei couples with a first unauthorized birth were fined an amount equal to 2.5 times the village p.c. income, while fines for a second birth above the authorized limit were 50 to 100 percent higher. In Pangxie, the fines were no less than 3,000 yuan for the first unauthorized birth and about 6,000 yuan for the second unauthorized birth. Today, in the two INCRC counties in Hebei, fines for the first birth above the limit are in an amount equal to about five times the p.c. village income. In Shanshui, out-of-plan births carry a fine of 2,000 yuan for the first unapproved birth, and 7,000-10,000 yuan for the second unauthorized birth, amounts equivalent to 3 to 5 times a village p.c. income. These figures roughly correspond to those reported in one county in Henan, where the amount of the fines collected increased from 2,000 and 3,000 yuan in 1993-1994 for the first and second birth above the limit, to 5,000 and 7,000 in 1995, and 7,000 and 10,000 in 1996, amounts which, in 1996, were equivalent to about 5 and 8 times a village p.c. annual income (Cao 2000). Townships governments were the major beneficiaries, retaining 50% of the fine. The remaining 20% went to the county and 30% to the village (Cao 2000). In Pangxie, the township retained 80% of the fine, the county 10% and the remaining 10% went to the city.

Mirroring the government’s effort to raise the center’s role in revenue collection through fiscal reforms, which allowed the center to play a significant re-distributive role (Zhang L.1999), provincial and city governments imposed a series of restrictions on the
collection and retention of fines for family planning. In 1998 the Shandong provincial government published regulations on the collection of fines, which limit the fine to 30% of the village p.c. income. The document further stipulates that the fines be turned in to the county financial office, with the provision that they will be invested in family planning (Zhongguo jihua shengyu weiyuan hui 1999:343). Similarly, in Huasheng, fines collected by village and township cadres are to be directly deposited into county coffers and allocated to family planning expenditures. In addition to these restrictions, decades of strict family planning policy paired with rapid social and economic advances have resulted in a shrinking number of out-of-plan births, hence fewer fines. Both these factors have contributed to the drying up of this local source of revenues for family planning.

At the same time, with the reorientation of the family planning program, the costs associated with the provision of family planning services have increased. Training for technical personnel in local family planning stations and the purchase of new equipment needed for the diversification of services provided have increased the financial demands on local family planning offices. The central government recommends that these costs should be increasingly born by local governments, who are encouraged to expand money inputs into family planning and reproductive health services. This should be carried out through the “establishment of a stable guarantee mechanism of input, including family planning expenditures into the government budget at different levels and [a gradual increase of] central and local financial input in population and family planning programs.” It further specifies “the increase of that input should be bigger than the increase in financial revenues” (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC
The level of appropriations for family planning from both national and local coffers should aim at exceeding 10 yuan per person by the end of 2005 (Document 8, 2000: 25). This increase can already be seen in available statistics. Per capita allocations for family planning have increased nationally from 1.93 yuan in 1993 to 4.69 yuan in 1999, from 1.56 to 4.94 in Hebei and from 1.37 to 5.03 in Shandong (Department of Planning and Finance, State Family Planning Commission 1999:80; 2000:86). The township contributes the largest share. For example in Huasheng, of the 4.5 yuan per person allocated to family planning, 2.5 are contributed by the township and 2 by the county. The city complements this sum with an additional 0.8 yuan per person. In all four counties, the share of the township budget devoted to family planning should account for at least 9% of the total township budget.

The recommended increase in the local share of investment in family planning is weighting heavily on localities. The shortage of finances for family planning is lamented strongly especially in poorer localities with fewer revenues from industrial and commercial sources. Under these circumstances, how do local family planning offices make end meet?

Our investigations have revealed two new sources of revenues. To compensate for the loss of revenue from fines, a social management fee (shehui fuyang fei) is now levied on couples who are permitted to have a second child. In Pangxie, revenues from the social management fee in 2000 accounted for about 20% of the total family planning budget for the county of approximately 300,000-400,000 yuan. In Shandong, couples applying for a second birth must pay 30% of the p.c. township income. The largest portion of this fee is shared between the city and the province and will be used to
supplement family planning budgets in poor areas where revenues from rural industry are scarce or nonexistent (Zhongguo jihua shengyu weiyuanhui 2000:343).

The provision of contraceptive and reproductive health services on a fee-for-service basis has also become a major source of revenue for the local family planning office. Fees are now charged for services which in the past were provided free of charge (IUD insertion and removal, pregnancy test, ultrasound checkup of IUD, service visit after sterilization). Services provided by county and township family planning stations have been diversified. Pre-and postnatal care including gynecological checkup, counseling for healthy child, and other related services which were previously provided by the health system, are now also offered by the family planning system for a fee. Some family planning stations also provide sterility treatment and advise on how to produce healthy babies. Stores are now located in the entrance of township family planning stations. Beside contraceptive supplies, they sell a variety of pharmaceutical products. In some townships, family planning stations have been relocated to busy streets to attract more customers. What we observed in Pangxie during our two most recent visits is telling. A county with only modest revenues generated by the rural economy, Pangxie boasts a longstanding success in family planning policy enforcement, with essentially no out-of-plan births. The county family planning administration is thinking hard on how to increase revenues from family planning. For the time being, they are busy planning the expansion of the provision of contraceptive and reproductive health services. In Pangxie, most township family planning stations we visited display “expanded” facilities including the addition of front-store pharmacy, selling medicaments for common diseases, contraceptives, morning-after pills, and abortion pills. Two price systems are charged for
contraceptive supplies, a lower price charged to married women in their service area and a higher price charged to the general public. The county family planning director is hoping that all township service stations will be moved to busy streets to generate more revenues. In this county, the family planning system is competing with the health system not only in the provision of reproductive health services, but also in that of basic medical services. In one township, family planning workers have been trained to provide door-to-door visit and treatment of minor illnesses for which they charge only small fees. When asked why this redundancy of services, family planning officials claim that their services are offered at a lower competitive price. Yet, a rivalry that has affected the relationship between the family planning system and the health system since the separation of the two systems in the mid-1980s (Kaufman, Zhang, Qiao and Zhang 1992) surprisingly does not characterize the new entrepreneurial activities of all family planning offices. In Ciqixian, the most urban and industrialized of the four INCRC research sites, the county family planning commission has established a partnership with the health department. The district family planning station was merged with the maternal and child health clinic formerly under the health department. Beside the provision of contraceptive and reproductive health services, the clinic with newly merged services specializes in prevention of inheritable diseases and infectious diseases that may cause birth defects. Some emphasis is being laid on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. The merge aims at maximizing efficiency and profits. The clients are mostly district non-agricultural workers, and rural farmers who cannot be treated at the township level. Fees are higher than in townships but lower than in district hospitals. The clinic is managed by the family planning committee and the health bureau. The former is in charge of
administration and the latter of clinical work. Here too there is a two-tier price system with higher prices charged to women from outside the area. Migrant women from neighboring rural areas or from adjacent counties are numerous, which helps the local family planning committee increase revenues. This merge, however, is still implemented on an experimental basis. Because of the long antagonistic history between family planning and health, higher level family planning officials remain wary. Were local experiments to prove successful, they fear a more general merger of the two systems. However, the augmented profits from the provision of family planning services are attractive. Indeed, the share of local revenues from these services may quite hefty. The mayor of one Shanshui township calculated that in 2000, out of a total 500,000 yuan township revenues, about 170,000 (34%) came from family planning service fees.

III.3.e. Change in the hold family planning cadres have on power

The changes in the nature and financing of family planning have important implications for the position of cadres in the bureaucratic hierarchy, in the local social structure and for the hold they have on power. The designation of the family planning policy as “basic state policy” (jiben guoce) which places family planning work at the center of the development strategy automatically awards family planning cadres a privileged position in the local bureaucratic hierarchy. Similarly, a significant source of power is entrusted upon family planning cadres by their ability to collect fines. Investigations by another observer of rural social and political life in Henan province revealed that, together with the tax office, the family planning office is the most powerful local government office, a power derived from their authority to collect money in the form of fines and taxes.
Similarly, our early field visits to the INCRC counties in the beginning of the 1990s revealed the privileged position of local family planning offices. Family planning cadres boasted their superior position over all other government offices, because their job gave them independent authority of rewarding and punishing other government officials, whose fertility they also control. Today this power has weakened significantly. Fewer couples have unapproved births. They no longer need to seek guanxi with local family planning officials to minimize the trouble associated with an out-of-plan birth. Greater compliance with the family planning policy implies fewer penalties and shrinking revenues from this source. Family planning cadres’ administrative authority over other government officials and over peasants has declined. From our recent interviews, there is a sense that family planning cadres regret the loss of this source of power. Some would rather go back to a time when the collection of fines was more frequent.

**IV. Conclusions**

From the distinct perspectives of the various echelons of the family planning bureaucracy, there are clear benefits to the program reorientation: Better contraceptive technology in the form of superior contraceptives and a service-focused approach appeals to the central government’s scheme of things. This formula nurtures the ideological association between socialism, science, technology, progress, and modernity. It is regarded more suitable to China’s current conditions under the transformation from plan to market.

SFPC officials may well see the program reorientation as a first step towards reproductive liberalization. Yet, they still feel ill-equipped to implement policy
relaxation even on an experimental basis. The shift of the emphasis from demographic targets to a client-centered approach also makes the Chinese program more palatable to the international community, and moderates the international criticism directed at the SFPC since the inception of the One Child Policy. Although this is not a major concern, it does make the SFPC’s work easier as the execution of “informed choice,” “quality of care” projects rely in part on outside funding.

From the standpoint of the local cadres, some of the appeal of this reorientation is practical: Better contraceptives, with fewer side effects, counseling on post-operation care and contraception, follow-up visits can reduce “unplanned” pregnancies, hence abortions, and increase the level of users’ knowledge and satisfaction, thus improving the traditionally antagonistic relations between cadres and masses. But lots of the appeal of the program reorientation is also financial. The reorientation requires large investments in family planning especially on the part of local governments. The top-down directives of improving service delivery involve additional training of family planning personnel and the purchase of expensive equipment, thus putting a strain on local coffers at a time when traditional sources of revenues for family planning are drying up. Local cadres are striving to find alternative ways to finance their work. The provision of contraceptive and reproductive health services for a fee is replacing the collection of fines for out-of-plan births as one major source of family planning revenues. The social management fee levied on couples who are allowed a second child has also come to represent a new source of revenue for the family planning budget. Both may represent a significant share of the total family planning budget.
Informed choice of contraceptive methods has introduced an element of choice which, in principle, should transfer the decision power about contraception from the state to the individual couple. From this perspective, the next natural step would be reproductive choice. Does this program reorientation provide the groundwork for future policy relaxation?

Our observations, and the contents of conversations and interviews over a decade of field visits to four counties of Northern China suggest there are forces both in favor and opposing policy change. Some of the reasons are intertwined with the intricacies of the organization of the family planning system. Each level is responsible to the higher level, and is evaluated based on the performance of the level it oversees. The level local cadres oversee is also the level that pays their salary. An example of how this affects the program reorientation is given by local cadres’ interpretation and implementation of informed choice. They are wary of informed choice because of its potentially destabilizing effects on fertility and the consequences this would entail for their job and career prospects. Many perceive informed choice essentially as a switch from sterilization to IUD for women with two children, and the increased amount of work associated with frequent monitoring of IUD users a heavy burden. They would rather go back to a time when the execution of family planning tasks was simpler and more straightforward.

Unlike the case of agricultural cadres, often former cadres in the Maoist era who took advantage of their privileged position to draw present benefits from their formerly established network of guanxi and control of resources (Oi 1986, 1999), the power derived from family planning cannot be easily transferred because it is built on social
isolation and a highly unpopular job of policing reproduction and punishing transgressors, a skill that cannot be easily applied to manipulate local forces. Under these circumstances, there may be vested interests among family planning cadres in preserving the status quo, oppose the transformation of the family planning program and promote policy change.

On the other hand, the program reorientation is also seen as a safety net that will ensure the continuation of the family planning establishment. It provides a scheme for family planning cadres to respond to the self-financing imperative but also for the survival of the system. Some of the services provided by the family planning system compete head-on with those offered by the health system. With fewer out-of-plan births implying the waning of the traditional tasks of family planning cadres, the provision of family planning and reproductive health services at competitive fees may improve the image of the family planning office and increase its chance of survival in later years when the policy will no longer be needed.

By the same token, the reorientation of the family planning program can deliver lucrative yields, and the incentive to push further in this direction may be strong. Until the early 1990s, the primary work of local cadres was to ensure that the state plan was implemented correctly and targets met. With the programmatic emphases on service delivery and on the integration of economic development and control of population growth, family planning cadres, like other government cadres supervising the various sectors of the rural economy, are learning the ways to oversee a commercial enterprise, to be good managers, gathering skills and ingenuity to help peasants prosper. These newly acquired entrepreneurial skills assist family planning cadres in their career moves within
the political-bureaucratic system and provide them with the opportunity to create a new role for themselves.

The perspectives of the clients of the program, which we have considered elsewhere (Merli and Smith 2000), suggest that experiments with policy relaxation with demonstration purposes could be undertaken, especially in areas that have experienced rapid socioeconomic development. In these areas, the demand for children has declined and national reproductive policies have been slowing internalized.

Although there is no official pronouncement, there is a lot of discourse on policy relaxation in national level family planning and academic circles in China. The Chinese government may be closer to a relaxation of the policy than they are willing to admit publicly, in part because they too sense that the demand for children has declined, in part because of the considerable political and economic cost of maintaining a stringent, totalitarian policy at a time when all other spheres of the society, polity, and economy are showing signs of greater openness and flexibility.
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